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THE RISE AND RISE OF THE ONE PERCENT: CONSIDERING
LEGAL CAUSES OF WEALTH INEQUALITY
Shi-Ling Hsu∗
ABSTRACT
Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century, which is surely one
of the very few economics treatises ever to be a best-seller, has parachuted
into an intensely emotional and deeply divisive American debate: the problem
of inequality in the United States. Piketty’s core argument is that throughout
history, the rate of return on private capital has usually exceeded the rate of
economic growth, expressed by Piketty as the relation r > g. If true, this
relation means that the wealthy class—who are the predominant owners of
capital—will grow their wealth faster than economies grow, which means that
relatively speaking, the nonwealthy will fall behind.
But even if we accept Piketty’s assertion that this has been a “historical
fact,” why is r > g most of the time? Piketty offers a few economic factors and
a few legal rules, but mostly demurs as to why the “forces of [wealth]
divergence” generally overwhelm the “forces of [wealth] convergence.” This
Essay argues that legal rules and institutions exhibit an inherent bias toward
some forms of private capital and serve to inflate returns to private capital—
Piketty’s r. Meanwhile, not only is it more difficult to make economic growth—
Piketty’s g—keep pace, but it is more contentious. The result is that returns to
private capital have indeed commonly exceeded the rate of economic growth.
This historical truism can be traceable to a capital-friendly bias that inheres in
legal rules and institutions. The bias is particularly pronounced in several
areas of law in which law and policy have inflated returns to private capital
and driven it well above the rate of economic growth, exacerbating economic
inequality. This Essay closes by arguing for a greater attention paid to
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INTRODUCTION
It is fantastic to believe that a dry, 577-page economics treatise with
ninety-seven graphs could rocket to the top of best seller lists and sit for weeks
alongside popular blockbusters such as Hilary Rodham Clinton’s
autobiography Hard Choices, Maya Angelou’s masterpiece I Know Why the
Caged Bird Sings (in the immediate wake of her May 28 passing), and the
boxed set of George R.R. Martin’s Game of Thrones books.1 But that is what
Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century2 has done, elevating the
French economist to a public status never attained by Adam Smith or Karl
Marx. In the United States, where his book sales have done particularly well,
Piketty finds himself in such an intense spotlight because he has waded into an
emotional and divisive debate on the problem of inequality. But his book also
attracts readers because his empirical approach stands in fresh contrast with the
predominating bombast and hand-wringing about either the “one percent”3 or
of “class warfare.”4 The inequality debate has become too coarse, and a public
need for cooler, more analytical voices has emerged. Still loved or hated at the
ideological poles,5 Thomas Piketty has become an important, cooler voice, one
that seeks to recast the inequality debate in more empirical terms.
Piketty’s argument—that without intervention wealth will unavoidably
concentrate in the hands of the few—has attracted both praise6 and criticism,7
1

Amazon Past Best Sellers, AMAZON (June 16, 2014), http://www.amazon.com/gp/bestsellers/2014-0616/books/ref=zg_bsar_nav_vg_0_vg#2; New York Times Best Sellers, Hardcover Nonfiction, N.Y. TIMES (July
20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/best-sellers-books/2014-07-20/hardcover-nonfiction/list.html.
2 THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014). The
book was originally published as LE CAPITAL AU XXIe SIÈCLE (2013).
3 See, e.g., Annie Lowrey, The Economics of Occupy Wall Street, SLATE (Oct. 5, 2011, 5:32 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2011/10/occupy_wall_street_says_the_top_one_1_percent_
of_americans_have_.html.
4 E.g., Republicans Accuse Obama of Waging ‘Class Warfare’ with Millionaire Tax Plan, FOX NEWS
(Sept. 18, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/18/rep-ryan-accuses-obama-waging-class-warfarewith-millionaire-tax-plan/.
5 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The Piketty Panic, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2014, at A25, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/opinion/krugman-the-piketty-panic.html; Alan Reynolds, Why Piketty’s
Wealth Data Are Worthless, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2014, at A11, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/alanreynolds-why-pikettys-wealth-data-are-worthless-1404945590.
6 See, e.g., Lawrence H. Summers, The Inequality Puzzle, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2014, at 91, available
at http://www.democracyjournal.org/33/the-inequality-puzzle.php; Robert M. Solow, The Rich-Get-Richer
Dynamic, NEW REPUBLIC, May 12, 2014, at 50, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/
117429/capital-twenty-first-century-thomas-piketty-reviewed.
7 N. Gregory Mankiw, Why Inheritance Is Not a Problem, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2014, at BU4, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/upshot/how-inherited-wealth-helps-the-economy.html; see also Martin
Feldstein, Piketty’s Numbers Don’t Add Up, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2014, at A15, available at
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but most credible economists respect his data-driven endeavor.8 Piketty’s main
observation is that historically, the rate of return on capital has usually been
greater than the rate of growth, expressed as the relation r > g,9 in which r is
the rate of return on private capital and g is the economic growth rate. Piketty
equates wealth with capital10 (a move meeting with some objection),11 so that
r > g implies that the wealthy class—who are the predominant owners of
capital—will grow their wealth faster than economies grow. That means that
relatively speaking, the nonwealthy will fall behind. The neoclassicist
economic response is factually accurate: poverty worldwide has fallen and in
general the wealth pie has grown.12 And yet, even if the poor are better off in
absolute terms, it has remained a source of discontent that they are poorer in
relative terms. The continuing political salience of the inequality issue suggests
that while a robust discussion can be had on the normative implications of
inequality, a parallel discussion on the causes of inequality is still well worth
having.
Piketty marshals vast amounts of data that span long periods of time and
several countries. Between 1976 and 2007, the top one percent of all
wage-earners garnered nearly sixty percent of the income growth in the United

http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304081804579557664176917086; Piketty vs. Mankiw on
Economic Challenges and Inequality, WBUR (Apr. 29, 2014), http://onpoint.wbur.org/2014/04/29/pikettymankiw-inequality-america-middle-class.
8 See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, First Thoughts on Piketty, GREG MANKIW’S BLOG (Apr. 25, 2014),
http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2014/04/first-thoughts-on-piketty.html; Kenneth Rogoff, Where is the
Inequality Problem?, PROJECT SYNDICATE (May 8, 2014), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/
kenneth-rogoff-says-that-thomas-piketty-is-right-about-rich-countries--but-wrong-about-the-world; see also
Bradford DeLong, Eleven (so far) Worthwhile Reviews of and Reflections on Thomas Piketty’s “Capital in the
Twenty-first Century,” WASH. CENTER FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Mar. 25, 2014, 5:48 PM),
http://equitablegrowth.org/2014/03/25/dialogue-ten-so-far-worthwhile-reviews-of-and-reflections-on-thomaspikettys-capital-in-the-twenty-first-century-wednesday-focus-march-26-2014/; Bradford DeLong, Over at the
Washington Center for Equitable Growth: Piketty Day Here at Berkeley, BRAD DELONG’S GRASPING REALITY
(Apr. 23, 2014, 11:02 AM), http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2014/04/piketty-day-here-at-berkeley-the-honestbroker-for-the-week-of-april-26-2014.html.
9 PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 25.
10 Id. at 47.
11 One could imagine that some forms of wealth, such as gold, could be in forms that do not generate a
return, as capital must, by definition. But as a prophylactic move, the conflation seems reasonable, as any pair
of definitions is unlikely to show that wealth and capital are uncorrelated concepts, and it avoids the difficulty
of defining “capital,” explored in Shi-Ling Hsu, Capital Rigidities, Latent Externalities, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 719,
727–29 (2014).
12 See, e.g., ANGUS DEATON, THE GREAT ESCAPE: HEALTH, WEALTH, AND THE ORIGINS OF INEQUALITY 1
(2013) (“Life is better now than at almost any time in history. More people are richer and fewer people live in
dire poverty. Lives are longer and parents no longer routinely watch a quarter of their children die.”).
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States.13 Over the past thirty years in the United States, a transfer of income
amounting to fifteen percent of national income—a little more than $2 trillion
per year14—has shifted from the bottom ninety percent to the top ten percent.15
A battery of other similar statistics leaves the reader with confidence that
Piketty is not, as some critics claim, merely cherry-picking.16 But a critical
question looms: why has r > g been true for most of history? How does it
actually happen that wealth concentrates so inexorably, interrupted only by
world wars and the Great Depression? How is it that the rich get richer and
richer and richer?
On this central question, Piketty, his supporters, and his critics are all
missing a huge piece of the puzzle: the role of law in distributing wealth. The
legal mechanisms by which the rich accumulate, consolidate, and increase their
wealth remains a black box in this discussion. On one level, if one accepts
Piketty’s thesis, then the assertion that law is at work in causing wealth
inequality is banal. Obviously, every economy is defined by the rules by which
market participants abide; there is no such thing as an economy unmoored
from law. But which laws, and exactly how do they lead to wealth inequality?
Piketty tosses out some snippets of law and policy that concentrate wealth,
such as trusts and estates law,17 and the lowering of marginal tax rates for
high-income earners.18 But these snippets do not explain the staggering shift in
wealth, suggesting that there is something more at work.
That something is a system of lawmaking that, with good economic
intentions, is biased towards the formation of certain forms of capital. This
capital bias has produced a set of legal rules and institutions that has increased
returns on certain forms of private capital without inducing a concomitant
increase in economic growth, and in some cases retarded economic growth. In
the parlance of Piketty’s r > g relation, the law has been much more effective
13 Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Top Incomes and the Great Recession: Recent Evolutions and
Policy Implications, 61 IMF ECON. REV. 456, 458 (2013), available at http://www.palgravejournals.com/imfer/journal/v61/n3/pdf/imfer201314a.pdf.
14 The U.S. Gross National Product in 2013 was $16.99 trillion. GNI, WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.MKTP.CD (last visited Jan. 26, 2015); see also Adjusted Net
National Income, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.ADJ.NNTY.CD (last visited Jan. 26,
2015) (noting a net national income of approximately $14 trillion for the United States in 2012).
15 Piketty & Saez, supra note 13, at 473.
16 Chris Giles, Piketty Did His Sums Wrong in Bestseller that Tapped into Inequality Zeitgeist, FIN.
TIMES, May 24, 2014, at 01, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/e1f343ca-e281-11e3-89fd00144feabdc0.html.
17 PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 362 (discussing trusts and estates law); id. at 451 (discussing dynastic trusts).
18 Id. at 513 (explaining the lowering marginal income tax rates).
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in boosting r than it has been in boosting g. This is understandable, because
inflating and propping up r is easy—government subsidies, favorable tax
treatment, and legal protections from regulatory interference are just a few of
many ways that lawmakers have boosted or propped up returns to certain
owners of private capital—the ones powerful enough to ask for them. It is not
nearly as easy to figure out how to make economic growth keep pace. Inducing
economic growth is a matter on which leading economists differ sharply,19 to
say nothing of an ideologically divided Congress. The world is an extremely
complicated place, made more so by globalization, and ensuring economic
growth has been much more art than science. Moreover, in modern times, the
political salience of “trickle-down” theories of economics20 have held
enormous influence over American policymaking, such that many lawmakers
are strongly inclined to believe that boosting private returns to capital
(Piketty’s r) is tantamount to boosting economic growth generally (Piketty’s
g).21 Taken together, these factors have caused lawmakers to mostly take
comfort in boosting returns to private capital and rationalize their indifference
to economic growth by throwing up their hands and just hoping that private
wealth will somehow also stimulate economic growth.
This Essay focuses on legal provisions and their impacts on returns to
capital, providing a policy concreteness that is a bit scarce in both Piketty’s
exposition and its critics. Perhaps more importantly, if some laws can be
demonstrated to artificially inflate returns on private capital and effectively
transfer wealth from the poorer to the richer, then these laws can be the focus
of reform. This would obviate the need for Piketty’s proposed reform, a global
wealth tax,22 which he acknowledges faces very high political obstacles in the
near term.23
I. THE LEGAL ENRICHMENT OF THE ONE PERCENT
Most microeconomic theory would appear to cut against Piketty’s thesis.
The most basic microeconomic concepts contemplate the ironing out of market
19 See, e.g., Victor R. Fuchs, Alan B. Krueger & James M. Poterba, Economists’ Views About
Parameters, Values, and Policies: Survey Results in Labor and Public Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE
1387, 1391 (1998).
20 For a relatively sophisticated, modern approach to trickle-down economics, see Philippe Aghion &
Patrick Bolton, A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development, 64 REV. ECON. STUD. 151 (1997).
21 Robert H. Frank, In the Real World of Work and Wages, Trickle-Down Economics Doesn’t Hold Up,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2007, at C3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/12/business/12scene.html.
22 PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 515–39.
23 Id. at 515.
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imperfections by gradually moving resources to their highest and best use.
Vast wealth inequalities seem anomalous in such a world, as one would expect
that relative poverty creates market opportunities for arbitrage. In theory,
mobile capital should flow to poorer countries because a higher rate of return
can be obtained where labor and other costs are lower; this would tend to
equalize wealth globally.24 And historically, advances in technology, provided
that they have been broadly shared, tended to compress wealth gaps.25 These
are what Piketty calls “forces of convergence,” tending to bring rich and poor
closer together. How is it that these forces of convergence are rarely able to
overcome the forces for divergence?
The answer is a mixed question of law and economics. There are, to be
sure, a number of economic mechanisms that contribute to inequality. Inflation
is generally regressive, as those owning real estate enjoy some hedge against
rising prices, while renters, who tend to be less wealthy, are buffeted by market
volatility.26 It is also the case that there are economies of scale to investing, so
that the wealthier are generally able to earn higher returns. It is a market truism
that risk and return are positively correlated,27 so that the wealthier, having
greater freedom to take risks, can garner higher returns.28 But such purely
economic phenomena are rare. Almost always, an economic effect can be
traced to some conscious policy decision, which in turn can be traced to a legal
rule or institution. As between legal and economic explanations for inequality,
it is almost surely a greater question of law than economics.
Piketty takes a stab at identifying some of the legal causes of inequality. He
devotes considerable attention to the emergence of exorbitant “supersalaries”
paid to some executives.29 A corporation shopping for a CEO faces a great deal
of uncertainty in future managerial performance, and given what is at stake, it
may well be rational for a corporation to seek out CEOs with a history of high
salaries as a signal of quality. This argument, a slight refinement to arguments
24 Id. at 69–71. Piketty acknowledges and extensively discusses why the global trade picture is much
more complicated. Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz has written about the complicated effects of globalization
and how it has mostly exacerbated wealth inequalities. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS (2002); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY (2012).
25 See, e.g., PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 21. But see Paul Beaudry, David A. Green & Benjamin M. Sand,
The Great Reversal in the Demand for Skill and Cognitive Tasks (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 18,901, 2013), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18901.pdf.
26 PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 455.
27 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for
Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (2011).
28 PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 430–31.
29 Id. at 298–302.
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put forth by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried a decade ago,30 is more of a
matter of corporate law than of economics. Corporate law could require
broader and deeper disclosures for high executive pay packages,31 or could
more strongly support shareholder proposals that seek to control executive
compensation.32 But the supersalary phenomenon is limited in its ability to
explain growing inequality. Not only is the Bebchuk and Fried thesis
disputed,33 it is not clear that this phenomenon has effected a very large wealth
transfer from poor to rich.34 Piketty himself shows that the rise of the
supersalary has been limited to the United States, the United Kingdom,
Australia, and Canada, while absent in continental Europe and Japan.35 But
continental Europe and Japan have also trended toward greater inequality.36 So
executive supersalaries may be unjust and perhaps even distortionary, but in
terms of inequality, is unlikely to be doing much of the heavy lifting.
So clearly, there is something broader and more fundamental at work. The
origins of the answer to this question must lie in an examination of the effects
of certain legal rules and institutions on inequality. What Piketty provides is, if
not an empirical agenda, two factors to focus on: the effects on rates of return
to private capital and the contribution to economic growth.
The thesis of this Essay is that legal rules and institutions are biased in such
a way as to over-promote the formation of capital by enhancing returns to
private capital. This Essay does not attempt to provide a comprehensive review
or evidence of which legal mechanisms contribute to wealth or income
inequality. Rather, the goal is to highlight a few areas of U.S. federal and state

30 Bebchuk and Fried postulated that the structure of executive compensation boards in corporations had
provided opportunities and incentives for the issuance of gargantuan pay packages decoupled from any merit
considerations. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE
OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 23–44 (2004).
31 See, e.g., id. at 192–93; Edward M. Iacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Compensation,
48 U. TORONTO L.J. 489, 504–10 (1998) (arguing that disclosure laws could increase executive
compensation).
32 See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive
Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1998).
33 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615,
1619–41 (2005) (reviewing BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 30); see also infra note 62 and accompanying text.
34 Piketty concedes so much: just looking at the top five corporate executives (whose salaries are
required to be made public) of top publicly-traded firms does not, by itself, illustrate how the advent of
highly-paid “supermanagers” accounts for the increasing wealth gap. PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 302.
35 Id. at 316–17.
36 For example, Piketty takes pains to note inequality is on the rise in his home country of France, id. at
271–81, as well as in Germany, id. at 323, and in Sweden, id. at 344–47.
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law that warrant special attention because they have inflated returns to private
capital without obviously contributing to economic growth.
This Essay will mostly avoid discussing how legal rules and institutions
affect economic growth, the other key parameter to Piketty’s r > g relation.
That is a morass of economic and legal policy, and the source of too much
partisan bickering. It is impossible to completely avoid discussion about
economic growth, as the vast majority of ill-advised economic policies that
inflate private returns to capital can also be putatively justified by their
capacity to spur economic growth. I will only make, when necessary, informal
comparisons between the effects of a legal rule on the rate of return on capital
with its effects on economic growth. To keep this discussion tractable, this
Essay focuses only on American law and American impacts. It is clear that
Piketty’s thesis has special relevance for the American experience.
A. Financial Regulation
The causes of the financial crisis are complex and still imperfectly
understood, but there is wide agreement that a number of deregulatory legal
moves were primarily responsible for the crisis.37 The Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000,38 which deregulated a number of derivative
financial products,39 the 2004 adoption of the Consolidated Supervised Entity
program by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),40 which
relaxed capital retention requirements for investment banks, the SEC’s
Regulation AB in 2005, which relaxed (and standardized) disclosure
requirements for asset-backed securitizations,41 and changes to the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code that enhanced the investment value of repurchase agreements
are legal changes among many that are offered as proximate causes of the
37

Stephen L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadows: Financial Regulation and Responsibility Failure, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1781, 1785 (2013); Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit
Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2011); see also Coffee, supra note 27, at 818; Steven M. Davidoff &
David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV.
463 (2009).
38 Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. E, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-365 to 2763A-461 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
39 Stout, supra note 37, at 3–4; see also Coffee, supra note 27, at 818 & n.69 (citing, inter alia, Thomas
Lee Hazen, Filling a Regulatory Gap: It Is Time to Regulate Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 13 N.C. BANKING
INST. 123, 128 (2009)).
40 Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers that Are Part of Consolidated Supervised
Entities, Exchange Act Release No. 49,830, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428 (June 21, 2004).
41 Asset-Backed Securities, Securities Act Release No. 8518, Exchange Act Release No. 50,905, 70 Fed.
Reg. 1506 (Jan. 7, 2005).
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crisis.42 In Piketty’s world, a recession, like a depression, should depress
returns to capital and act as a wealth equalizer.43 This recent crisis, however,
seems to have exacerbated wealth inequality. Why?
Fundamentally, the financial crisis occurred because the massive
withdrawal of credit was the reaction to the realization of widespread, systemic
risk.44 In significant part, the financial crisis was the suffering of self-inflicted
wounds by risk-takers who simply failed to understand the nature of the risk
they were assuming.45 Managers at AIG, in particular, utterly failed to
comprehend the inter-relatedness of all the risk they took in the form of credit
default swaps.46 But this assumption of private risk is not problematic. Indeed,
risk is usually (obviously not always) good for the wealthy who can afford it,
and over the long run, obtain the higher returns that derive from risky
portfolios.47 Enabling risk-taking is the law’s way of inflating the returns to
capital—Piketty’s r.
It is the public nature of systemic risk that is problematic and made this last
crisis a force of wealth divergence. The instability of banks created a credit
crisis that threatened not just a handful of wealthy investors and managers but
a much wider circle of borrowers, including the vast majority of American
businesses that depend on credit for cash flow to conduct their business and
employ workers. With the sharp contraction in credit availability, businesses
suffered and unemployment soared, reducing consumer spending just when the
economy needed it most, and further pushing the economy into a nasty spiral
of business failures leading to more unemployment, leading to even less
spending. All of this occurred because some legal rules enabled or encouraged
risky behavior by some managers that generated systemic risk, which imposed
losses on those that took no part in the assumption of risk, and were least able
to absorb the loss. That widespread risk is an externality. As others have
pointed out, systemic risk that poses a threat to the entire economy imposes

42 See Stout, supra note 37, at 3–4; Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking
System, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2010, at 261, available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/projects/bpea/fall%202010/2010b_bpea_gorton.
43 PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 275.
44 Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198 (2008).
45 Coffee, supra note 39, at 822–23.
46 Id. at 822; René M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2010,
at 73, 79–83.
47 PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 430–31.
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social costs well in excess of the market punishments meted out to managers
responsible for creating that risk.48
And yet, the focus of finance and corporations law is to regulate relations
among private parties—investors, directors, managers, and perhaps, under the
guise of bankruptcy law, creditors.49 Securities laws are concerned with
protecting the integrity of the market, lest there arise some concern that would
cause investors to lose confidence and withdraw from the market.50 But there is
little sense in the law that the finance industry and corporations impose
externalities upon a broader society, despite their capacity to redirect the flow
of trillions of dollars. Normative and positive research into the functioning of
business organizations as an actor in a broader societal fabric have been largely
cabined to the area of scholarly research known as “Corporate Social
Responsibility.”51 Otherwise, lawmaking and legal scholarship in the areas of
finance and corporations law seem to be based predominantly on the notion
that the only truly interested parties are private ones.52
Take for example, two competing accounts of culpability for the excessive
risk-taking leading up to the financial crisis. Over the past decade, Lucian
Bebchuk and several coauthors have argued that executive compensation has
become completely disconnected from performance.53 Stock options were
supposed to give managers incentives to improve their firms and increase

48 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 39, at 809; David Min, Understanding the Failures of Market Discipline,
92 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 62–63), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2403988; Schwarcz supra note 44, at 207.
49 See, e.g., Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, GEO. MASON U. L. REV.,
Summer 1989, at 99, 100 (“The contractual theory views the corporation as founded in private contract, where
the role of the state is limited to enforcing contracts.”).
50 The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates
Capital Formation, U.S. SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified June 10, 2013).
51 See, e.g., Paul R. Portney, Corporate Social Responsibility: An Economic and Public Policy
Perspective, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS 107 (Bruce L. Hay,
Robert N. Stavins & Richard H.K. Vietor eds., 2005).
52 See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 738
(1997) (“Our perspective on corporate governance is a straightforward agency perspective, sometimes referred
to as separation of ownership and control. We want to know how investors get the managers to give them back
their money.”); see also Butler, supra note 49.
53 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 30; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation
as an Agency Problem, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2003, at 71, 82; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger
Spamann, The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE
J. ON REG. 257, 273 (2010); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J.
247 (2010).
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shareholder value,54 but in practice managers have taken risky,
highly-leveraged bets for short-term gains, cashed out their options, and left
their companies in a long-term mess.55 In this recent financial crisis, senior
managers at Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, the two most leveraged and
vulnerable of the independent investment banks, received lavish pay packages
even as they left their firms in tatters.56 In this “managerial power” view,
managers have incentives to take excessive risks because they share in the
upsides but are insulated by their compensation packages from the
downsides.57 How might one remedy this? One might mandate that executive
pay packages replace options with subordinated debt, so that if long-term risks
materialize, executives lose.58 That is an example of a legal fix for a
quasi-economic problem.
But a competing explanation for risk-taking is that it is the shareholders
driving the risk, not the managers.59 A number of studies have found that
financial institutions with greater shareholder control were more exposed to
risk and ultimately suffered greater losses than those with weaker shareholder
control.60 In this “shareholder power” view, it is the shareholders, being
broadly diversified, that are tolerant of risk and are in fact driving the
risk-taking.61 How might one remedy this? One proposal is to require firms to
offer “contingent capital” that converts into preferred stock and takes priority

54 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 53, at 72 (“[B]oards are assumed to design compensation schemes to
provide managers with efficient incentives to maximize shareholder value.”).
55 Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 53, at 271.
56 Bebchuk, Cohen & Spamann, supra note 53, at 262–63, 270–71. A recent unreported decision by
arbitrators found that Lehman Brothers’s accounting firm, Ernst & Young, was not to blame for an accounting
maneuver that allowed Lehman to conceal from investors billions of dollars of debt and seemed to imply that
Lehman’s executives bore most of the culpability. Matthew Goldstein, Arbitrators Ease Blame on Auditors of
Lehman, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2014, at B1, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/arbitratorsease-blame-on-auditors-of-lehman/.
57 See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 53, at 252; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Freid &
David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 751 (2002).
58 Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk
Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1227–29 (2011).
59 Coffee, supra note 39, at 812.
60 Andrea Beltratti & René M. Stulz, Why Did Some Banks Perform Better During the Credit Crisis? A
Cross-Country Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 15,180, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15180.pdf; Reint Gropp & Matthias
Kohler, Bank Owners or Managers: Who is Keen on Risk? (European Bus. Sch. Research Paper Series
No. 10-02, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1555663.
61 See Coffee, supra note 39, at 812.
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over common stock, so that if long-term risks materialize, shareholders lose.62
That is also an example of a legal fix for a quasi-economic problem.
What is worth noticing about this disagreement is that both sides agree that
there was too much risk-taking and that it was at least a proximate cause of the
financial crisis. Both argue that the structure of corporate ownership—a
product of corporations law and of other legal rules—encourages the excessive
risk-taking.63 For our purposes, it does not truly matter whether it is the
shareholder or the manager that is driving the risk—all would agree that
existing corporate laws, coupled with the light regulation of financial
institutions, have given rise to too much risk. It would stand to reason that
remedies to address these risk incentives are legal in nature and would
disincentivize risk-taking, whether it is by the managers or the shareholders.
It seems doubtful that the financial industry would knowingly, by
rent-seeking through deregulation, create such an implosive economic
atmosphere. But recent research suggests exactly that. Carmen Reinhart and
Kenneth Rogoff have studied not only business cycles but also the political
pressures preceding and succeeding them.64 We should not be surprised that
their title, This Time is Different, is ironic in that financial catastrophes have
occurred repeatedly throughout history and that financial regulation tightens
after each crash, only to gradually erode over time to political pressures to
deregulate.65 Along similar lines, Thomas Philippon and Ariel Reshef argue
that a huge wage premium for finance executives—250%—was in large part
driven by financial deregulation.66 So although a colossal crash like the recent
financial crisis does create winners and losers within the financial industry, on
the whole, a deregulated environment seems to be a more favorable one for the
finance industry. Reinhart, Rogoff, Philippon and Reshef, all economists, raise
a problem with the lawmaking of financial regulation.
What was different this time around, it appears to be, was the extent to
which risk became such a deadly social cost. Financial regulation and other
laws governing business entities qua business entities has, in turning attention
62

Id. at 825–46.
Mara Faccio, Maria-Teresa Marchica & Roberto Mura, Large Shareholder Diversification and
Corporate Risk-Taking, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3601, 3603 (2011).
64 CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF
FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009).
65 Id. at 223–39.
66 Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Finance Industry: 1909–
2006, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1551, 1605 (2012).
63
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away from social costs, allowed a huge body of law to develop in a social
vacuum. Other substantive areas of law such as antitrust law or environmental
law may seek to internalize certain kinds of externalities, but it is clear that
financial regulation and corporations law has, by focusing so intently on the
private parties to transactions, played a key role in allowing the one percent to
separate themselves from the ninety-nine percent.
B. Oil and Gas Subsidies
For just over a century, the Internal Revenue Code has contained tax
benefits for capital projects undertaken for the purposes of exploration and
extraction of oil and natural gas.67 The most generous of these are the ability to
expense “intangible drilling costs,” ancillary costs that have no salvage value
and are “incident to and necessary for the drilling of wells and the preparation
of wells for the production of oil and gas.”68 These include surveying,
ground-clearing, and other site-preparation costs, as well as costs for
chemicals, cement, and other supplies necessary to prepare for exploration or
extraction.69 These expenses may be deducted from income as ordinary
expenses in the year they were incurred, rather than over a period of years
under normal cost recovery accounting procedures,70 a significant benefit in
the form of deferred tax liability.71 The Congressional Research Service reports
that “[t]he purpose of allowing current-year expensing of these costs is to
attract capital to what has historically been a highly risky investment.”72
Another tax benefit is the allowance of oil companies to take a deduction of
fifteen percent of gross income, against gross income, as a proxy for the
fictional depletion of their oil deposits.73 The United States is unusual among
energy-producing countries in that oil and gas resources are generally owned
by the surface landowner, not the government.74 This means that oil deposits
are assets. Oil companies sought and obtained recognition that their oil

67 The expensing of intangible drilling and exploration costs for independent oil and gas producers has
been allowed since 1913. ROBERT PIROG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42374, OIL AND NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY
TAX ISSUES IN THE FY2013 BUDGET PROPOSAL 3 (2012), available at http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
crsr42374.pdf.
68 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (2014).
69 Id. § 1.612-4(a)(2), (3); PIROG, supra note 67, at 3.
70 See I.R.C. § 263(c) (2012); PIROG, supra note 67, at 3.
71 See PIROG, supra note 67, at 3.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 2.
74 Thomas W. Merrill, Four Questions About Fracking, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 971, 977 (2013).

HSU GALLEYSFINAL

2015]

1/30/2015 8:06 AM

RISE OF THE ONE PERCENT

2057

deposits should be depreciable just like bricks and mortar and other productive
capital in other manufacturing industries.75 Rather than try to estimate the
value of their deposit and deduct from their annual income taxes, owners of oil
deposits may simply deduct fifteen percent of their gross income as a generous
estimate for the depreciated value of their oil and gas deposits.76
These subsidies, dating back to 1913, succeeded in reducing the risk
associated with oil and gas exploration and caused much capital to flow into
the oil and gas industries.77 One hundred two years ago, these would have been
justifiable on the grounds that they boosted economic growth. Subsidized oil
and gas extraction in 1913 dramatically lowered energy prices, spurring the
growth of new industries and new transportation opportunities.78 Were Thomas
Piketty writing in 1913, he would have had to concede that the economic
effects of these projects were very high, and moreover that Δr < Δg.
However, that was then and this is now. New technologies such as
three-dimensional seismic analysis and horizontal drilling techniques have
greatly reduced the risk of exploration.79 These tax benefits almost certainly do
not stimulate any significant amount of extra oil or gas production.80
Moreover, renewable substitutes for fossil fuels abound, some of them rivaling
fossils in cost.81 Even if renewable energies do not supplant fossil fuels, they
introduce an alternative that is in most cases less costly when taking into
account the external costs of fossil fuel combustion.82 Thus, while these oil and
75

PIROG, supra note 67, at 5.
Id.
77 See James C. Cox & Arthur W. Wright, The Cost-Effectiveness of Federal Tax Subsidies for Petroleum
Reserves: Some Empirical Results and Their Implications, in STUDIES IN ENERGY TAX POLICY 177, 188–89
(Gerard M. Brannon ed., 1975) (finding that special tax provisions induced the petroleum industry to maintain
larger investments in proved reserves); Walter J. Mead, The Performance of Government in Energy
Regulations, 69 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 352, 352 (1979) (“These tax subsidies [percentage
depletion allowance and expensing of intangible drilling costs] led to increased capital flows into
exploration.”).
78 Mead, supra note 77, at 352.
79 PIROG, supra note 67, at 3.
80 See, e.g., Paul Davidson, Public Policy Problems of the Domestic Crude Oil Industry, 53 AM. ECON.
REV. 85, 107 (1963) (“The depletion allowance is primarily an ad valorem subsidy to mineral rights owners.”).
81 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF NEW GENERATION
RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 (2014), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/
electricity_generation.pdf.
82 Fossil fuels impose costs on others that are not fully taken into account by the fossil fuel industry or by
consumers of fossil fuels, and are thus “external” to both. These costs can outweigh, sometimes very greatly,
the pecuniary costs of producing energy. See, e.g., TOM TIETENBERG & LYNNE LEWIS, ENVIRONMENTAL &
NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 25–26 (10th ed. 2015); Anthony D. Owen, Renewable Energy: Externality
Costs as Market Barriers, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 632, 632–34 (2006).
76
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gas tax benefits boost returns to private capital, their contribution to economic
growth is minimal, and they likely subsidize behavior that is, net of external
costs, less desirable than alternatives.
The cost to American taxpayers of these oil and gas subsidies is not very
high: about $4.8 billion per year.83 But it is important to remember that these
subsidies have existed for more than 100 years and have cumulated a large
amount of wealth over that time. Moreover, these subsidies stand as stark
testimony of the willingness of lawmakers to suspend disbelief and cling to
implausible claims of economic growth as a justification for conferring
benefits to capital owners. It is as if policymakers will endorse any proposal
that purports, however speculatively, to boost economic growth. If a proponent
says with a straight face that a proposal will boost economic growth—Δg > 0
in Piketty-speak—then private investors are given the blessings of enjoying
fabulously high rates of return on their capital. That is the crux of the Piketty
problem: as long as an argument is made that Δg > 0, then very high rates of
return to private capital go unquestioned. There is often really no assurance
that Δg > 0, or that policy will really pay for itself by inducing economic
growth.
C. Grandfathering
There is perhaps no more pervasive subsidy propping up returns to capital
than the common practice of grandfathering, or more generally “transition
relief.” New regulations often exempt existing regulatory targets in a variety of
ways and to varying degrees. In environmental law, pollution sources or land
uses may have a grace period from application of a new regulation, be
subjected to a lower standard of compliance, offered some compensation for
new regulation, be exempted altogether or indefinitely, or any combination of
these techniques.84 It seems that it has especially been the case in

83

See PIROG, supra note 67, at 2.
Bruce R. Huber, Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 91, 92 (2011)
(“This distinction reflects a recurring political problem faced by makers of environmental policy.”); Jonathan
Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to Environmental Grandfathering, 36 ECOL.
L.Q. 809, 811 (2009) (“Such systems have become increasingly common in the context of environmental and
natural resource regulation.”); Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental
Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1680 (2007) (“The
problem of whether and how to extend favorable treatment to existing sources is a recurring issue in
environmental law.”); see also, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, Vintage-Differentiated Environmental Regulation, 25
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 29, 31–32 (2006).
84
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environmental law that lawmakers worry about negative impacts on capital and
have tried to avoid reducing returns to private capital.85
The normative discussion on grandfathering has been largely
efficiency-oriented, centering on a discussion of how to allocate the “costs of
legal transitions.”86 A variety of concerns over grandfathering suggest that it
introduces inefficient distortions,87 reducing economic growth by implication.
Grandfathered status also represents an asset to incumbents holding them and a
barrier to entry for new entrants.88 This would have the ironic effect of slowing
capital turnover, delaying the achievement of the policy goals.89 Such a
dynamic effect has the dual effect of boosting returns to private capital and, by
rewarding inefficient incumbents and penalizing efficient new entrants,
reducing economic growth. Finally, grandfathering has an ex ante effect of
inefficiently stimulating the formation of capital by insuring against regulatory
interference or obsolescence. An important component of risk facing new
capital is the risk of premature obsolescence, due to regulatory action, to the
emergence of superior alternatives, or to some other unexpected shock. By
insuring capital investors against this risk, even partially, grandfathering
inefficiently inflates returns to private capital and induces overinvestment in
capital.90

85

Huber, supra note 84, at 127 (“Both state and federal lawmakers have shied away from imposing the
enormous costs associated with the mandatory retrofit, upgrade, or retirement of in-use diesel trucks . . . .”).
86 Id. at 92; see also DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS
OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 218–20 (2000); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986).
87 See Shi-Ling Hsu & James E. Wilen, Ecosystem Management and the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act,
24 ECOL. L.Q. 799, 810 (1997) (noting that if transition relief is pegged to historical baselines, the anticipation
of new regulation may cause regulatory targets to boost their baselines in the hopes of securing a larger share
of the impending transition relief); Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1657, 1661–65 (1999) (arguing that it usually the private regulated party that is better able to anticipate
change, and that grandfathering therefore represents a distorting subsidy); Nash, supra note 84, at 811 (“The
allocation of resource access [using a grandfathering-based system] creates an incentive for societal actors to
engage in a race to capture future resource access, on top of the then-existing race to capture the resource
itself.”); Nash & Revesz, supra note 84, at 1725 (noting that regulatory targets might, in anticipation of
transition relief, have less incentive to anticipate foreseeable legal changes, for example, as a result of
emerging public health or safety concerns).
88 Shi-Ling Hsu, The Real Problem with New Source Review, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,095, 10,096 (2006).
89 See, e.g., id. at 10,096; John A. List, Daniel L. Millimet & Warren McHone, The Unintended
Disincentive in the Clean Air Act, ADVANCES ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, Feb. 2004, art no. 2, at 1, 12–14;
Randy A. Nelson, Tom Tietenberg & Michael R. Donihue, Differential Environmental Regulation: Effects of
Electric Utility Capital Turnover and Emissions, 75 REV. ECON. & STAT. 368, 373 (1993).
90 Hsu, supra note 11, at 760–64.
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And yet, grandfathering is ubiquitous. Zoning laws commonly allow
existing “nonconforming uses” to persist through a zoning change rendering it
illegal, at least until there is some significant change to the property, such as a
fire.91 Emissions standards for passenger vehicles are periodically tightened to
require lower tailpipe emissions, but existing vehicles are only required to be
inspected periodically for the worst emissions, and even then owners are only
required to expend fairly minor sums of money to alleviate their vehicle
emissions.92 Heavy-duty diesel engines, which are far more harmful and
durable than passenger vehicle engines, are not required by federal law to
comply with 2001 emissions standards if they were in use when the new
regulation was promulgated.93 When Congress first required the registration of
pesticides in 1972,94 it required that compensation, at fair market value, be paid
to manufacturers of existing pesticides if those pesticides were cancelled or
suspended under the new standards.95 Most Western states have a “prior
appropriation” means of distributing water rights that allocates water rights to
first-users.96 In times of water scarcity, prior appropriation rights exclude all
others, including conservation uses.97 In all of these cases, very significant
social harms could have been avoided by denying transition relief, and yet in
all of these cases, transition relief was granted. More importantly, for our
purposes, transition relief was made to mimic the expectations of capital
owners in the form of their hoped-for stream of benefits, with the effect of
propping up returns to private capital (Piketty’s r). So common is the provision
of at least some transition relief98 that potential regulatory targets (such as
polluters) can confidently count on it to partially insure against changes in

91

2 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 12.20 (5th ed. 2014).
Huber, supra note 84, at 127.
93 Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards and
Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements, 66 Fed. Reg. 5002 (Jan. 18, 2001); see also 40 C.F.R.
§§ 69.52, 86.004-11, 86.007-11, 86.009-11 (2014).
94 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, sec. 2, § 3, 86 Stat. 973,
979–82 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2012)).
95 Id. at sec. 2, § 15, 86 Stat. at 993–94 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136m (2012)).
96 See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public
Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOL. L.Q. 53, 93–194
(2010).
97 See id.
98 See generally Maria Damon et. al, Grandfathering (Indiana Univ., Bloomington Sch. of Pub. & Env’tl
Affairs Research Paper No. 2012-11-03, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2182573 (providing a
holistic overview of grandfathering in multiple contexts).
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legal rules that might jeopardize their capital.99 Transition relief has made the
obsolescence and external costs of capital everybody’s problem except the
owners of that capital.
Why do we grandfather? In large part, an intuition about fairness makes it
discomfiting to change the rules of the game on someone making a large
investment in capital. The instinct to grandfather also hearkens back to
concerns of regulatory uncertainty inefficiently stifling capital investment. The
regular practice of grandfathering is an assurance that rules governing the
operation of capital will not change arbitrarily. It has been argued in favor of
grandfathering that regulatory bodies, not capital investors, are in a better
position to anticipate new regulation.100 But to the extent that new regulation is
meant to address changing market conditions and emergent harms of some
product or process, it would seem to be the capital investors themselves that
have the best information about their products or practices. It does not seem
onerous for capital investors to undertake the due diligence of vetting the
soundness of their investment on many dimensions, including its social costs.
For example, as many chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing are known only
to the oil or gas company using them,101 it would seem anomalous to require
some assurance from a regulatory body that there will be no interference with
their use.
Grandfathering represents perhaps the starkest and most pervasive example
of how legal rules and institutions have implicitly assumed the role of
promoting and protecting capital. Small wonder that r > g; the ubiquity of
grandfathering has elevated it to near norm status. A misguided instinct for
fairness towards capital owners has diverted attention not only from other
stakeholders impacted by capital but from the larger question of the role of
capital in a competitive economy.

99 Nash & Revesz, supra note 84, at 1726 (“[W]hen the government enacts a new legal regime with
transition relief, it sends a signal to society at large that, in general, changes in legal standards will not govern
existing actors.”).
100 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Dangers of Unbounded Commitments to Regulate Risk, in RISKS,
COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION 135, 135–40 (Robert W. Hahn ed.,
1996).
101 Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 729, 763–64
(2013).
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D. Electric Utility Regulation
There is an area of American law that comes close to undertaking the dual
analyses of returns to private capital and economic growth that I advocate in
this Essay. Electric utility regulation in the United States (in the states where
electricity generation remains regulated, which is most of them) treats
electricity generation as a “natural monopoly”102 and grants generators the sole
right to generate and sell electricity within a specified territory.103 However,
the nature of utility regulation is that these sanctioned monopolists can only
charge rates approved by a state commission or the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), in the case of interstate or wholesale electricity sales.104
Generally, rates are permitted in accordance with the formula
R = O + (B x r)
where R is the total allowed revenues (to be divided up among ratepayers), O is
the allowed operating expenses, B is the company’s “rate base,” all those
capital assets from which the company is permitted to earn a return, and r is
the permitted rate of return.105 What is allowed to be included in the rate base
is also a matter of commission adjudication, which must strike a balance
between customers’ interests in minimizing electricity rates (and therefore
minimizing the rate base) and the utility’s interest in passing through as much
cost as possible to customers (and therefore maximizing the rate base).
Commissions are guided by standards for when an asset such as a generating
station can be included in the rate base: investments must be “prudently
incurred”106 and must be “used and useful.”107 It is expected that commissions
will allow utilities a return on capital that is less than what a monopolist would
earn, but more than the average cost of capital.108

102

FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 53 (3d ed. 2010).
Id.
104 Id.
105 See, e.g., id. at 65; MARLA E. MANSFIELD, ENERGY POLICY: THE REEL WORLD 129 (2001).
106 See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 305 (1989).
107 See id. at 308–09. For further analysis and illustrations of how Commissions assess whether an
investment is “prudentially incurred” and “used and useful,” see Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas
Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 289 (1923)
(Brandeis, J., concurring); Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Phila. Elec. Co., 31 P.U.R.4th 15 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n
Dec. 28, 1978); Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548 (1969).
108 Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview, in STUDIES IN
PUBLIC
REGULATION
1,
10–11
(Gary
Fromm
ed.,
1981),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11429.pdf.
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This process is admirably explicit in its consideration of two competing
concerns: consumer welfare and returns to private capital (for the utility).
However, there is good reason to suspect that utilities have held an advantage
in being able to “stuff” excess capital into their rate bases and pass costs
through to rate paying customers. The “Averch-Johnson effect”109 posits that
regulated utilities will utilize more capital (as opposed to labor, which cannot
be included in the rate base) than a cost-minimizing firm would utilize.110 This
is a less efficient allocation of inputs than a cost-minimizing firm would make
and passes that inefficiency along to ratepayers in the form of higher rates. But
it results in higher returns to private capital for shareholders of the utility
(assuming it is an investor-owned utility). Empirical studies have generally
confirmed this result, though not unambiguously.111
It could be that as a matter of administrative law, there exists an inherent
bias predicted by Averch and Johnson. However, for purposes of this Essay, it
is more important to notice that the administrative lawmaking surrounding rate
base cases seems to tilt towards concern with returns to private capital and
away from concern with ratepayer welfare. Several cases arose in the 1980s in
which utilities sought to include in their rate base nuclear power plants that,
while “prudent” at the time of investment, had become unnecessary in light of
conservation measures that had sharply reduced electricity demand. In Jersey
Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, the court held that the FERC was
required to make a finding as to whether it was “just and reasonable” to
exclude the unamortized portion of a nuclear power plant from the rate base if
it caused the utility to become financially distressed.112 The majority opinion,
parenthetically, was delivered by none other than Judge Robert Bork, who had
already made his mark on antitrust law in arguing for a “total efficiency” test
for anticompetitive conduct. But the more illuminating opinion was authored
by Judge Starr, in concurrence, in which he tracked a body of jurisprudence
and documented its departure from the “used and useful” standard which
served for decades to discipline utilities and regulatory commissions against an

109 Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM.
ECON. REV. 1052 (1962).
110 Alvin K. Klevorick, The Behavior of a Firm Subject to Stochastic Regulatory Review, 4 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. SCI. 57, 57–58 (1973).
111 See, e.g., Léon Courville, Regulation and Efficiency in the Electric Utility Industry, 5 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 53 (1974); H. Craig Peterson, An Empirical Test of Regulatory Effects, 6 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 111 (1975); Robert M. Spann, Rate of Return Regulation and Efficiency in Production: An Empirical Test
of the Averch-Johnson Thesis, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 38 (1974).
112 Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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Averch-Johnson bias.113 In counseling against the “ill-conceived and overly
broad attack on the ‘used and useful’ principle,”114 Judge Starr nevertheless
emphasized the need for balancing the interests of ratepayers and of
investors115 and concluded that this case called for greater attention to investor
interests.116
On a similar set of facts, in In re Limerick Nuclear Generating Station,117
the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission similarly allowed the inclusion of
an extraneous nuclear power plant into its rate base even though it was not
“used and useful,” because it was, at the time of investment, prudently
incurred. The case, one of only a few cases that even mentions the
Averch-Johnson effect, seemed utterly dismissive of a fairly developed and
sophisticated body of research:
This concept, developed in the early 1960s, maintains that the utilities
will invariably seek to overbuild their systems. . . . The
Averch-Johnson phenomenon is no longer applicable—Even if it did
apply in the early 1960s, there is little current credibility to the A-J
phenomenon given the current depressed financial condition of the
industry.118

It is not my contention that as a jurisprudential matter, these cases are
wrongly decided. However, I do contend that the administrative lawmaking of
utility regulation has gravitated toward a greater concern for rates of return on
private capital, in large part through the erosion of the “used and useful”
test.119 Over time, it seems that returns to private capital receive greater
consideration than more general concerns of consumer welfare, capital
productivity, or economic well-being. Utilities law, as an example of this bias,
has thus paid far more attention to the owners of capital than to the welfare of
its ratepayers or any other broader public interest.

113
114
115
116
117
118
119

(1987).

Id. at 1188–94 (Starr, J., concurring).
Id. at 1188.
Id. at 1191.
Id. at 1193.
48 P.U.R.4th 190 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n May 7, 1982).
Id. at 211–12.
See, e.g., James J. Hoecker, “Used and Useful”: Autopsy of a Ratemaking Policy, 8 ENERGY L.J. 303
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II. ZOOMING OUT: WHY DO THESE LAWS PERSIST?
Why do these legal rules and institutions arise and persist? Why don’t the
ninety-nine percent rise up in electoral anger and smite down the one percent?
The answer has to do with the capital itself. Theories of rent-seeking are
nothing new, but the nature of the rents sought (and obtained) have not
received much scrutiny. Legal rules and institutions most commonly distribute
rents by promoting the formation of private capital or by boosting returns to
private capital. While capital is essential to economic growth, the long-term
nature of capital is such that it creates an incentive for owners of that capital to
resist change. It is thus the very nature of capital, which in Piketty’s account is
responsible for creating inequality that also sustains inequality. The law thus
acts as a force of divergence in two stages: first, by directly contributing to the
formation of private capital (predominantly to the benefit of the one percent)
and second, by protecting that capital from regulation or competition that
might devalue that capital.
Promoting the formation of private capital—boosting Piketty’s r—might
not contribute to wealth inequality if it also contributes to economic growth.
Done properly, private capital should sustain economic growth. However, the
legal rules and institutions that affect the formation of capital have not always
produced capital that contributes to economic growth. Too often, they reduce
economic growth. But as a matter of political economy, legal preferences for
capital are easy to obtain. Boris Bittker predicted in 1955 the emergence of “a
trend that, though leaderless and planless, may become an almost irresistible
movement for a taxpayer’s option to deduct capital investments, either in the
form of a deduction when the costs are incurred or as an allowance for
amortization over a very short period.”120
Governments at all levels have demonstrated an inclination to use “carrots”
instead of “sticks” to achieve policy goals,121 and the carrots frequently take
the form of some capital promotion or protection. Scattered throughout the
Internal Revenue Code are carrot-like provisions that lower the cost of private
capital or increase the returns to private capital.122

120

Boris I. Bittker, Tax Policy Aspects of the Code, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 230 (1955).
Gerrit De Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, The Rise of Carrots and the Decline of Sticks, 80 U. CHI.
L. REV. 341 (2013).
122 See Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots; Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price
Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797 (2012).
121
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Financial regulation, electric utility regulation, and oil and gas subsidies are
areas that have played a critical role in economic growth and development, and
therefore benefitted from this capital bias. Promoting the formation of capital
in these industries is viewed as promoting economic growth and development.
On the merits, this is sometimes true, but sometimes not. As argued above,
102 years ago, when the oil industry was a nascent industry with high capital
costs, one could readily make the argument that a small subsidy could unlock
important markets with high consumer surplus; low energy prices played a
critical part in creating wealth and several expensive and important war efforts.
But there is no real dispute that in the modern energy era continuing
subsidization of these industries is wasteful.123 Nevertheless, oil and gas
subsidies persist and have augmented returns to private capital without making
much difference in economic growth. Under these circumstances, subsidized
capital boosts returns to private capital without contributing to economic
growth, and in fact derogates from economic growth.
But apart from its spotty record on the formation of capital that is
economically useful, the greater force of divergence is the propensity of law to
protect that capital even when it suffers from inefficiencies. As I have argued
in another article, the downside of capital is that it creates a policy inertia that
may interfere with welfare-increasing reform, including that which would
improve economic growth.124 Capital is acquired to obtain a future stream of
benefits. Once acquired, the owners of that capital will oppose any policy
changes that threaten that future stream of benefits. Fortunately for owners of
capital, lawmakers are downright obsequious in making sure that returns to
private capital are protected from legislative or regulatory avarice. Lawmakers
have, as discussed above, been overwhelmingly disposed toward
grandfathering existing capital into older, weaker regulations. Thus, even if
capital is inefficient and fails to contribute to economic growth (or reduces
welfare by, among other things, imposing environmental externalities), the
political economy of capital ensures that a stream of benefits flowing from
capital will be interrupted only at great political cost. Moreover, with legal
rules and institutions promoting capital formation and implicitly subsidizing it,
capital has gotten bigger and has therefore enlarged the incentives to resist
reform. This resistance to reform is the reason that wealth inequality persists.

123
124

See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
Hsu, supra note 11, at 722–27.
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Of course, capital is not always just a vehicle for private greed and public
inefficiency. There are many legitimate, welfare-enhancing reasons for
boosting returns to private capital. First, capital and labor are almost always
complementary to some extent.125 Activating capital usually creates jobs.
Second, political and regulatory uncertainty can inefficiently suppress capital
formation, so that protecting capital from the whims and caprices of regulators
and politicians can be economically efficient.126 Finally, as was true in the oil
and gas industries 102 years ago, unlocking critical markets may generate
consumer surplus well in excess of a capital-promoting government
expenditure. These policy considerations in favor of promoting capital are
valid but are commonly over-emphasized relative to the downsides of
capital.127 The operation of capital may have latent externalities (for example,
adverse environmental effects) that may not be fully appreciated by either
capital investors or regulators at the time of capital acquisition. Capital could
also have a latent inefficiency; some capital becomes obsolete quickly. But the
potential for these latent downsides are rarely scrutinized carefully and receive
much less attention than the alleged upsides. This asymmetry in attention has
created a built-in bias in legal rules and institutions favoring the formation and
protection of capital, leading to an overabundance of capital in some
markets.128
This two-staged exploitation of the legal system for promoting and
protecting capital has the dual effects of exacerbating wealth inequalities and
grinding legal and economic reform to a halt. Rents are extracted, and because
capital formation policy is haphazard in terms of economic growth, capital is
formed in ways that create high returns to private capital but do not contribute
to economic growth. Once capital is formed, it creates a strong incentive to
resist reform that threatens the value of that capital.

125 The Cobb-Douglas production function, which every economics student learns about in undergraduate
economics, posits production as a function of the quantity and productivity of just two types of inputs: labor
and capital. See Charles W. Cobb & Paul H. Douglas, A Theory of Production, 18 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS &
PROC.) 139 (1928). The now-familiar Cobb-Douglas formulation, Y = ALαKβ, with Y representing output, L
representing labor, and K representing capital, is a foundational relation in economic theory. See id. at 151–52.
126 AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1994); Ben S.
Bernanke, Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Cyclical Investment, 98 Q.J. ECON. 85, 103 (1983).
127 Hsu, supra note 11, at 720–22.
128 Id. at 744–60 (describing overabundance of capital in oil and gas, mining, and electricity industries).
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III. A FORCE OF CONVERGENCE: EDUCATION
“Capital” is such a broad term that it is hard to generalize about its
contribution to economic growth. Policies that can serve as a force of
convergence are rarely clear-cut, but there is at least one form of capital that
everyone agrees is a vital ingredient to economic growth: “human capital,” or
education.129 Economic productivity is observed to be clearly, consistently, and
significantly greater in the presence of human capital.130 A central
recommendation of Piketty is to increase spending on education,131 even
though he acknowledges that educational systems are in need of reform.132
An adequate supply of human capital is a necessary, but not a sufficient,
condition for economic growth to occur. Fundamentally, economic growth
occurs because either latent markets are opened up or because innovation
expands an economy’s production possibility frontier.133 Human capital drives
innovation, which is itself an engine for economic growth, but also facilitates
the adoption of new technologies, as higher-skilled workers with richer human
capital are more able to adapt to changes in technology.134 Better still, human
capital produces knowledge spillovers, as interactions among skilled
individuals generate mutually beneficial enhancements to human capital.135
And yet, human capital tends to be undersupplied relative to physical
capital for two reasons. First, from an individual viewpoint, human capital is a
riskier investment than an investment in physical capital. If an expected return
on physical capital, such as a hot dog stand, is equal to the expected return on

129 GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 17 (3d ed. 1993).
130 Id. at 59–131; Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1961).
131 PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 313.
132 Id. at 483–84.
133 N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer & David N. Weil, A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic
Growth, 107 Q.J. ECON. 407, 408 (1992).
134 Daron Acemoglu & Joshua Angrist, How Large are Human-Capital Externalities? Evidence from
Compulsory Schooling Laws, in 15 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 2000, at 9, 9 (Ben S. Bernanke &
Kenneth Rogoff eds., 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11054.pdf; see Paul M. Romer,
Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 71, 99 (1990).
135 This idea derives in part from the work of Jane Jacobs, who theorized that cities are places for the
exchange of ideas. JANE JACOBS, THE ECONOMY OF CITIES 3–4 (1969). This was more theoretically formalized
by economist Robert Lucas. See Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J.
MONETARY ECON. 3 (1988). Empirically, the results have been inconclusive. See Acemoglu & Angrist, supra
note 134, at 10–11; James E. Rauch, Productivity Gains from Geographic Concentration of Human Capital:
Evidence from the Cities, 34 J. URB. ECON. 380 (1993). But see James J. Heckman, Policies to Foster Human
Capital, 54 RES. ECON. 3 (2000) (concluding that American society underinvests in children).
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human capital, such as a bachelor’s degree in English, a risk-averse individual
would be more inclined to invest in the hot dog stand. That is because human
capital cannot be bought or sold like physical capital can, so diversifying a
capital stock requires more time and resources normally available to an
individual.136 By contrast, the transferability of physical capital means that an
individual does not need to diversify.137 A hot dog stand in a diversified
economy has a positive salvage value; it can always be sold. But an education
cannot; it is “stuck” to the individual having it. All other things being equal,
individuals would choose the less risky physical capital. Second, human capital
is undersupplied because it confers positive externalities in a way that physical
capital generally does not: human capital is knowledge, and the greater the
stock of knowledge, the greater the knowledge spillovers, and the higher the
rate of accumulation of more knowledge. Knowledge begets more knowledge,
and does so more easily if there is more knowledge to begin with.138
Unfortunately, the political economy of human capital development is
generally not favorable.
Economists Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz argue in their book, The
Race Between Education and Technology139 (which Piketty cites with
approval),140 that American economic dominance of most of the twentieth
century was a product of its extraordinarily egalitarian and compulsory public
schooling, which created a broadly educated work force that was able to adapt
to a changing technological environment.141 Apart from generating outsized
returns for female students142 and African-American students,143 compulsory,
free public schooling generated positive network effects by lifting up an entire
populace.144 The failure of the United States to replicate this educational boost
for the latter part of the twentieth century is, as Goldin and Katz argue, a large
part of the country’s relative underperformance over this same period.145

136 David Levhari & Yoram Weiss, The Effect of Risk on the Investment in Human Capital, 64 AM. ECON.
REV. 950, 950 (1974).
137 Id.
138 Heckman, supra note 135, at 5 (“Early learning begets later learning . . . .”); see Acemoglu & Angrist,
supra note 134, at 10–11.
139 CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY (2008).
140 PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 306.
141 GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 139, at 29; see also Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 134, at 9.
142 GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 139, at 78 tbl.2.5 (showing higher returns for education for women for
college and business school, but not high school).
143 Id. at 21–22.
144 Id. at 29.
145 Id. at 320–23.

HSU GALLEYSFINAL

2070

1/30/2015 8:06 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

[Vol. 64:2043

Tax laws work to the disadvantage of higher education, vis-à-vis physical
capital. Tuition is not deductible, but cost of acquisition of physical capital
is.146 Several tax credits and deductions were made available as part of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009147 but amount to no more
than $2,500 per student from qualifying families, or a similarly modest tax
deduction for nonqualifying families.148 The late economist and human capital
pioneer Theodore Schultz complained, “Our tax laws everywhere discriminate
against human capital. Although the stock of such capital has become large and
even though it is obvious that human capital, like other forms of reproducible
capital, depreciates, becomes obsolete, and entails maintenance, our tax laws
are all but blind on these matters.”149
Fundamentally, the Internal Revenue Code simply does not recognize
human capital as capital. In part, it may be because of a prosaic problem: what
would be the amortization period for a college degree? Still, even an
implausibly long amortization period, say the average lifetime of a taxpayer
obtaining a college degree, is better than no deduction at all. As opposed to
routine deduction of the costs of acquiring physical capital, educational
expenses are deductible in only some very narrow circumstances.
Tellingly, educational expenses are deductible if incurred under
circumstances in which the education is likely to enhance private returns.
Treasury Regulation 1.162-5 allows educational expenses to be deducted if the
education “[m]aintains or improves skills required by the individual in his
employment or other trade or business.” But if it is general learning or
education, then it is a non-deductible personal expense.150 Nor are educational
expenses deductible if the education is required to meet the minimum
educational requirements of a business or trade. So the expenses of a J.D.
degree are not deductible, but for a practicing tax lawyer that has already

146

Philip A. Trostrel, The Effect of Taxation on Human Capital, 101 J. POL. ECON. 327, 328 (1993).
Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
148 Press Release, IRS, Special IRS Web Section Highlights Back-to-School Tax Breaks; Popular 529
Plans Expanded, New $2,500 College Credit Available (Sept. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Special-IRS-Web-Section-Highlights-Back-to-School-Tax-Breaks;-Popular-529-PlansExpanded,-New-$2,500-College-Credit-Available.
149 Schultz, supra note 131, at 13. It is true that higher education is financed by foregone earnings, which
are not taxed, suggesting that perhaps acquiring human capital should not enjoy a tax benefit. Michael J.
Boskin, Notes on the Treatment of Human Capital 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 116, 1975), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w0116.pdf. However, especially in this era of high
tuition, tuition is likely to be a larger cost than foregone earnings.
150 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(1) (2014).
147
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passed the bar exam, an L.L.M. degree in tax is deductible.151 Similarly,
education to qualify for a new trade or business is nondeductible. So persons
finding themselves in an obsolete trade or business are discouraged from
retooling and shifting into a new trade or business. One would think that it
would be desirable to incentivize a labor force to be adaptive to new
developments, but the tax law is evidently not the vehicle for doing so. It does
the opposite.
Certainly, greater education funding is not by any stretch of the imagination
a panacea for addressing inequality. It has hardly gone unnoticed that the
political economy of education spending tends to perpetuate wealth
inequalities by skewing expenditures to favor wealthier populations.152 This
pathology likely extends to the reforms that have been put forth to improve
educational outcomes.153 To be sure, educational funding and policy is a
complex matter. Care must be taken in the apportionment of public education
dollars and in the actual delivery of public education.
Thus, while this Essay does not purport to be a manifesto or a treatise on
educational reform, it highlights the reasons for prioritizing funding for
education at all levels. Human capital is generally undersupplied in any case.
But more pertinent to this Essay, if one shares Piketty’s concern over
inequality, then it is clear that the development of human capital is critical. It is
difficult to figure out how to boost economic growth, but it is clear that an
educational system that does not offer an education to a sufficiently broad
segment of the population will both undermine economic growth and
exacerbate inequality. In an era of scarce resources, then, spending government
resources to boost returns to private capital in the wishful thinking that there
will also be resultant economic growth will generally be a more fanciful
proposition than funding education.
CONCLUSION
The problem with the inequality debate is that arguments advocating or
opposing wealth redistribution usually take on the nature of an accounting

151

I am indebted to my colleague Steve R. Johnson for this example.
See, e.g., Mark Gradstein, The Political Economy of Public Spending on Education, Inequality, and
Growth (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3162, 2003), available at
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-3162.
153 See, e.g., PAULINE LIPMAN, HIGH STAKES EDUCATION: INEQUALITY, GLOBALIZATION, AND URBAN
SCHOOL REFORM (2004).
152
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dispute. If redistributionists argue that the top one percent earn almost twenty
percent of the country’s taxable income, the top one percent can counter that
they also pay thirty-five percent of the country’s income taxes.154 The point
isn’t whether the rich are “paying their fair share” of taxes. There is no fair
share. There are only value choices about wealth distribution.
Piketty’s proposed global wealth tax is a responsive and efficient way of
combating the forces of divergence, but there are a number of political
predicates and obstacles that render such a proposal improbable for the
near-term. This Essay offers an alternative. I urge a closer examination of legal
rules and institutions for their separate effects on returns to private capital and
their contribution to economic growth. It seems that up to this point, a legal
rule is considered desirable if it is believed to contribute positively to
economic growth. If so, the returns to private capital are not questioned. This
approach suffers from two problems. First, it runs the substantial risk of
producing false positives. There are strong incentives for rent-seekers to
present a very optimistic projection for economic growth under the proffered
rule or policy. Second, if exorbitantly high returns to private capital are
tolerated, then it becomes a nearly insurmountable challenge to reform
governance of that capital, as it will have become larger and more important to
its owner. Thus, for a new policy proposal, separate evaluations should be
made of its effect on returns to private capital and its effect on economic
growth. The latter determination is very challenging, but some attempt would
be superior to the current approach of essentially trusting private businesses to
make that determination or that private wealth inevitably trickles down to the
less wealthy. In addition to applying a new test to prospective changes in law,
it seems desirable to revisit some past changes, comparing them against prior
rules as a baseline. In particular, revisiting financial sector deregulations and
laws in the energy field might be fruitful.

154 Kevin McCormally, Where Do You Rank as a Taxpayer?, KIPLINGER (Jan. 17, 2014),
http://www.kiplinger.com/article/taxes/T054-C000-S001-where-do-you-rank-as-a-taxpayer.html.

